Communications Architecture provides a fiamework to develop an integrated space, air, and terrestrial communications network that supports all national security users (DoD, Intelligence Community, and civil), all information domains, and all levels of classification. The architecture provides a basis for developing a communications investment strategy to satisfy Joint Vision 2020 imperatives. The architecture kamework consists of an integrated, intemetted high capacity space backbone, high capacity terrestrial gateways, fiber entry points, airborne communications nodes, and software programmable tactical terminals that are handheld or embedded on weapons platforms. Dynamic routing, prioritization, and bandwidth allocation in space, air, and terrestrial layers ties the architecture together, eliminates stovepipes. An NSSA led Architecture Development Team ' comprised of thirty stakeholder organizations developed the architecture and a set of proposed recommendations for presentation to the NSSA Senior Steering Group.'
JV 2020 Imperatives
J V 2020 states that combat forces must close in theater rapidly, conduct decisive operations immediately after closing, be highly agile in order to shift combat power form one objective to another at will. JV2020 also states that combat forces must fight in non-linear enclaves in which joint forces converge and focus combat power at relatively low tactical levels. Traditional service boundaries will be blurred or eliminated. Forces must achieve information dominance. This implies that warfighters at all levels must have immediate and uninterrupted access to all relevant information regarding friendly and enemy situational awareness, future plans, and operational status. This information may be located in national databases in CONUS, in CINC databases in secure sanctuaries outside of CONUS, or in operational and tactical level databases in Joint Task Force areas of operations.
Proposed Recommendations
The CA ADT investment strategy recommendations address communications as an enterprise They describe a set of integrated space, air, terrestrial, and network communications elements that must be implemented to treat communications as an enterprise.
Goal: Treat Communications as an Enterprise
Currently, communications are treated in an ad hoc basis by individual organizations, agencies, services, and their subdivisions. This approach means that any opportunity for synergy and interoperability is serendipitous, at best, and costly and inadequate, at worst. By treating communications as an enterprise, in the business sense, end-to-end and government-wide, there is the opportunity to maximize communications performance and reduce costs by allocating resources and functionality rationally across terrestrial, air, and space layers. In addition, there is the further opportunity to increase efficiency by allocating within the space, air, and terrestrial layers across organizations. Overarching Recommendation: Integrated, robust network over the space, air, and terrestrial environments with dynamic routing, prioritization, and bandwidth allocation:
Many major national security networks, especially the longhaul space networks, are currently circuit switched. While circuit switching is a powerful technique that is appropriate for many types of service, there are some services that are better suited to other techniques such as packet switching.
Therefore, the NSSA recommends upgrading the capability of networks over all communications layers, space, air, and terrestrial to make them better suited to bursty traffic to provide more efficient exchanges of data between multiple users and multiple types of users. The reason for this networking approach is to improve interoperability among systems and provide tools to support the effective management of limited communications resources within the National Security Community.
The networking domain relies almost exclusively on the use of commercial standards, protocols, and applications to achieve interoperability. Implementing packetized networks is a low technical risk venture because of the maturity of the technology and vendor acceptance of the associated standards. The ADT agreed in principle that a movement toward a packetized network environment would be a major enabler for achieving interoperability. However, military network standards may require integration with the commercial networks. Hybrid networking may be necessary to accommodate military-unique features.
A mobile, ad hoc, self-organizing networking capability is needed to support rapid deployment forces and reduce the burden on strategic lift. + +
Enables the last tactical mile
Enables the future user class envisioned to need wide-band two-way communications to highly mobile small terminals + Moves most maneuver ground communications infrastructure to high altitude to solve mobility, capacity and ground threat problems.
Current terrestrial communications networks are not as mobile as their supported maneuver elements. The ability of these networks to support highly mobile forces and small, dispersed units on a non-linear battlefield is marginal.
A deployable ACN could support a strategically responsive force enabling dominance across the full spectrum of operations. This concept significantly reduces strategic lift and supports highly mobile decisive military operations. It reduces the extensive manpower, equipment, and associated ground forces currently required for tactical communications. This in turn reduces the requirements for personnel end strength and support equipment associated with ground communications. ACNs can self-deploy and thus enable the Army goal of deploying five divisions in 30 days. ACNs extend the range of ground radio nets. They provide a highly responsive network blanket for: mobile forces and bridge the gap between satellite coverage and terrestrial fiber.
The candidate for the ACN used for CONOPS and costing by the ADT is the current Global Hawk platform. The team was particularly concerned about two issues with ACNs:
+ There is no funding for development of a production Global Hawk communications platform Engineering work has yet to be done for integrating optical heads on a Global Hawk platform to provide high-capacity uplinks to the Space Domain.
Commercial platforms were considered and closely examined in this study. They are reaching a level of maturity that will allow them to support enduring missions that do not require rapid deployment and quick strike operations. They can augment Government ACNs.
The ADT recommended the following actions to ensure the development of a robust agile network that deploys quickly and supports a highly mobile force: The ADT recommended the following actions to improve space capabilities and support to national security systems, and as an essential step in the development of a space network:
4 Acquire common interoperable cross-linked space coinmimications satellite constellations to improve reuchback, network pevformance, interoperability, survivability, and support to disadvantaged users.
Initially, these links might be used only as intraconstellation links.
Establish common radioJLeguency ( 2 ) and optical standards for the communications and relay satellite cross-links so that cross-constellation and common connections will support the migration to an integrated relay-backbone system as required at a future date.
4
The initial advantages of the interoperable cross-link architecture are that it: + Potential to Reduce cost by reducing infrastructure
Cross-banding -Rap*
and automaticaUy Connects All Users
Cross-banding is the ability for the information flow on different "bands" (UHF, SHF, EHF, commercial, relay, terrestrial, airborne, and so on) to be interconnected. While this is not always possible (wideband traffic cannot successfully flow over narrowband communications systems), there is a broad need for as much cross-banding as possible. Recommend that all packet switches be implemented with cross-banding capabilities, and the "smart delivery" provision of the Information Management Commerce has displaced the government as the main engine for developing advanced information technology and innovative approaches for delivering information. While these advances and innovations may satisfy some critical National Security Community needs, they are generally brought to market only if there is a credible business case to justify the investment. Because some needs are unique to national security, the National Security Community must take on a portion of the burden of system development. This path, however, negates the advantages of commercial economies of scale found in production and associated costs.
The U.S. Government invests approximately $4.5 billion (FYOO) to acquire, operate, and maintain its national communications architecture. In addition, approximately $1 billion (FYOO) was invested in basic science and research for communications and information management technologies. To fully develop the national security communications capabilities described in this report, the distribution of R&D funds should include the following proposed research activities. The ADT did not address the Information Assurance (U) function during the development of the point designs and recommendations primarily because other elements of the GIG enterprise were actively addressing IA issues and because of time and resource constraints. A basic need is for real-time visibility into and network security monitoring of system user, local area, and wide area network traffic profiles and volume. These capabilities, along with other measures such as link encryption and tunneling of addresses, are vital for network managers and operators to detect, protect, and recover the computer and communications infi-astructure from malicious re-routing,
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spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks. The team recognized the need for a National Security Community strategy to implement such a capability.
Few business enterprises require protection to the same level as national security communications systems. The global bankitig and finance community, however, has a similar requirement to protect sensitive information. If the protection measures acquired by this community satisfy some of the national security communications needs, then those measures should be applied. Because of the sensitivity and classification of national security information, the community should not fully rely on the commercial market to develop the capability. A business case may not exist for the commercial world to lead the way in the national security IA domain.
Network Security Monitor (NSM) products and standards are available on the open market. However, the integration of the NSM with other needed network management and simulation tools suitable for the real-time national security environment must be addressed.
Tunneling of addresses is a useful firewall technique to disguise addresses for protection against network spoofing, or rni~routing.~ Protection against network spoofing requires limiting access to network switches and Network Security Monitor (NSMs) as well as the use of strong authentication mechanisms. Such mechanisms exist and are not viewed as a developmental requirement, although incorporation of such protection is an essential component of the h4Ih4
architecture.
The ADT recommended the following actions to achieve some limited measure of information assurance:
+ Develop an information assurance architecture, including optical security, to enable implementation of the national security MIM recommendations.
Develop a multi-gigabit (greater than 2.5 Gbh) encryption capability for use over packetized networh-s and connections. 
